Contrary to a popular belief that Chinese corporate governance, specifically the executive compensation scheme, does not work effectively, we provide new empirical evidence. Moreover, the function of Chinese boards and their sub-committees is believed to be more cosmetic than effective. We have found that executive cash compensation is more related to accounting and stock market performance when the proportion of independent directors on board is larger. And our results show that the independent directors on board work more effectively on setting executive compensation to the maximum of shareholder wealth if they have a compensation committee to offer them help and provide information. Perhaps even more importantly, our analysis has further revealed for the first time that such overall significant effect of board independence on executive pay-performance link is driven by firms with a compensation committee and that no such relation exists for firms without a compensation committee. As such, our study complements earlier works which tend to point to significant impact of board independence on executive pay-performance relation in general.
Introduction
Recent scandals related with executive compensation have attracted public attendance on the debate about restricting executive compensation and reforming the associated governance structure. Executive compensation plays a key role in corporate governance structure by providing motivations for executives to perform their duties to the maximization of shareholders' wealth (Andersen and Bizjak, 2003) .
For most firms, the specific design of executive compensation is delegated to a sub-committee of the board of directors: the compensation committee (CC). The board of directors get to approve the final executive pay schemes and thus the boards and their compensation committee both play an important role in linking executive pay to firm performance, and as well aligning the interests of managers with shareholders (Sun and Cahan, 2009 ).
Similar to its Western counterparts, the board of directors in Chinese listed firms delegates the rights regarding executive compensation to its compensation committee.
Therefore, the board characteristics and compensation committee qualities play an important role in determining executive compensation. Recently the code of corporate governance implemented in 2003 for listed firms in China stipulates that executive compensation should reflect firm performance, accordingly enhancing pay-for-performance relation and emphasizing the role of executive compensation governance mechanisms in Chinese listed firms from the standard setters' viewpoint.
Though corporate governance in Chinese listed firms have been improved since then, there are still three fundamental issues regarding corporate governance in China: the expropriation of large shareholders, the neglect of duties by directors, and insider control. Thus, the monitoring role of the board and the executive compensation, whether or not it is set by the compensation committee, to a large extent will affect corporate governance in Chinese firms and hence mitigate relative agency issues.
Furthermore, not like their existing Western counterparts with long history, the compensation committee was only recommended by the Corporate Code 2001 by CSRC in China. Until now, the formation of compensation committee is still not a requirement for publically listed firms, making China a good example to investigate the voluntary formation of compensation committee in recent years as well as its effect on CEO pay-performance relation.
Our study contributes to the literature in the following ways. First, the empirical evidence to date on certain governance structures to motivate managers to increase firm performance is mixed and gives little coherent support for the shape of an optimal governance structure. For example, the results of board independence on setting optimal executive compensation are inconclusive by using either Western data or Chinese data. Even there are considerable studies on executive compensation in US firms 1 , systematic research is only a few outside of the US as a result of limited data availability. Moreover, an interesting research question is whether the independent board and compensation committee are independent or are somehow inter-related. For example, they substitute for each other or complement each other. Therefore, our study fills the void by providing evidence on board of directors, compensation committee, and executive pay-performance relation in Chinese listed firms. Secondly, the compensation committee composition data, for example, the proportion of independent directors on the committee, is not provided by any database in China when there is no any mandatory requirements for listed firms to disclose these information. We hand-collected the data on compensation committee composition from voluntary disclose in the annual report and for the first time investigated the relation of compensation committee independence and executive pay-performance.
Thirdly, prior evidence on board independence and executive pay-performance is mixed (e.g., Conyon and Peck, 1998; Dahya and McConnell, 2005) . Our study focuses on the role of compensation committee and suggests a stronger relation between board independence and executive pay-performance when the compensation committee presents, partially contributing to an alternative explanation for the mixed results. That is, complement effect between independent board and the presence of 1 See, for example, Murphy (1999) reviews empirical studies on executive compensation when Gibbons (1997) reviews the pertinent theoretical literature.
compensation committee is found and hence both board monitoring and compensation committee are required to maximise the CEO pay-performance relationship.
Our paper focuses on the governance environment, specifically the board structure and compensation committee composition. We examine the relation between CEO compensation and corporate performance and investigate the role played by the board of directors and a compensation committee on executive pay-performance link by Our results indicate that board independence produces a stronger relation between executive compensation and firm performance in Chinese listed firms. This association is driven by those firms which have a compensation committee (β=13.39
and . β =1.58 for firms with a compensation committee and firms without a compensation committee, respectively). Moreover, the positive relation between board independence and executive pay-performance link is more evident in well performing firms and in firms with very large or very small board. For example, the estimates on coefficients of the interaction term (performance*board independence)
are significantly positive for both sub-samples (p=0.03 for small boards and p=0.01
for large boards). Further tests show that independent directors on board work more effectively in setting right executive pay in the time periods after (β=5. 33, p=0.01) than before the formation of a compensation committee (β=1.52, p=0.3). On the other hand, no significant relation was found between the proportion of independent directors on a compensation committee and executive pay-performance link.
In the next section, we begin with literature review and hypotheses development on Chinese executive pay-performance and corporate governance with particular emphasis on compensation committee, and then introduce the data and describe our empirical strategy in Section 3. The results are presented in Section 4, followed by a concluding section.
CEO compensation, firm performance, and board characteristics

CEO compensation and firm performance
Aiming at aligning CEO's interests with shareholder and maximizing shareholder wealth, the CEO compensation should be tied to firm performance (Fung et al., 2001 ), or in other words, the pay-performance sensitivity should be high. Kato and Long (2006b) affirm two types of acute principal-agent issues in China: the diverging interests between managers and shareholders and the diverging interests between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. They support that tying the wealth of managers to firm performance can align the interests of shareholders and those of managers. Hence, linking managers' personal fortune to firm's breaks up the "ligament" between the controlling shareholders and managers and thus helps in protecting the interests of minority shareholders.
There is only a few research on the link of CEO compensation and firm performance in China and also provides mixed results. Kato and Long (2006a) providing evidence on a significant association between the return on assets and CEO compensation in Chinese listed firms while no such relation is found between stock returns and CEO compensation. However, the findings of Mengistae and Xu (2004) show that the CEO pay-performance sensitivity decreases with the variance of performance by using a sample of 400 Chinese state-owned enterprises in the 1980s.
They also find executive pay-performance sensitivity increases with managerial control and market competition faced by the firm. Moreover, Firth et al (2006) point out that the sensitivity of CEO pay and performance is low on average compared to Western counterparts while they document a relation between CEO cash compensation and firm performance in another study a year later (Firth et al., 2007) .
They provide evidence that ownership and governance factors are determinants of CEO cash compensation.
In summary, although some extant research find no or little evidence on executive pay-performance relation, many prior theoretical and empirical studies document a positive relation between executive compensation and firm performance, suggesting that firm performance plays an important role in setting executive compensation contracts. Therefore, CEO pay-performance relation can be deemed as one indicator of corporate governance structures (Conyon and He, 2008) and hence other governance mechanisms can be investigated in light of CEO pay-performance relation.
Board composition
Critics of executive compensation practices argue that the board does not design the executive compensation schemes to maximize value of shareholders because of the CEO power on board (Core et al., 1999) . Outside directors inclined to effectively monitor the management because they are less affected by CEO power and aim at protecting their reputations in the labour market (Fama and Jensen, 1983) . However, when outside directors are too busy, have insufficient information pertaining to the firm or get appointed by the CEO, they may perform less effectively (Jensen, 1993) . Lambert et al. (1993) and Boyd (1994) found that executive compensation is more linked with firm performance in firms with a larger proportion of outside directors on board.
In Chinese listed firms, many directors found it difficult to exert any significant influence, other than figure influence, on the firm they serve. Therefore, in August 2001, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) released statement 102 "Guidelines for establishing an independent directors system for listed companies" in which one third independent directors are required for listed firms by June, 2003.
CSRC's 2002 corporate governance code also requires that independent directors must spend enough time on the firms they serve and one director cannot hold more than five directorship positions at the same time. However, there is difference between Chinese boards and the US boards due to different legal and institutional contexts, even the boardroom in China is getting much closer to its US counterparts.
The independent directors in US focus more on solving agency cost problem while the independent directors in China aim at protecting shareholders, specifically minority shareholders (Kato and Long, 2006a) , due to different ownership structures in China. Furthermore, compared to China, the US has stronger securities regulation and more severe punishment for wrong-doing, resulting in higher costs for violations of securities law and regulations. Additionally, China has highly concentrated ownership when state dominates a large proportion of total shares. Combed together, the specific independent board structure and ownership structure make China an interesting example to examine the association between board structure and executive pay-performance relation. This idea gives rise to our first hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1a. Top managers' compensation is expected to be negatively associated with the proportion of independent directors on the board.
Hypothesis 1b.
Companies with larger proportion of independent directors on the board will have a stronger link between their top managers' pay and corporate performance than other companies.
Compensation committee
The characteristics of compensation committee have considerable impact on the effectiveness of compensation committee. Since early 1990s, compensation committee attracts more and more concerns from shareholders. From 1991 to 1995 there were 161 shareholder proposals related to CEO compensation (Johnson and Shackell, 1997) . Among them twenty proposals concern the issues of compensation committee independence. Williamson (1985) comments that managers are likely to write their own pay contracts with one hand and sign them with the other in firms without compensation committees. Main and Johnston (1993) point out that a compensation committee is expected to exert an influence on top executive pay, which should be set in the interests of shareholders. However, simply reduce the pay of self-serving managers is not the only purpose of compensation committee, more importantly, economic and agency theories would suggest that directors on the compensation committee determine the appropriate design of executive pay and align the interests of management and shareholders (Conyon et al., 1995; Main and Johnston, 1993 Second, we assembled basic data on compensation committees from China Stock We only include observations for the nine industries that have at least ten observations with complete data so that we can generate reasonable estimates for the sub-industry indicator variables in our study. Finally, we delete observations without the availability of executive compensation, accounting and financial data, and corporate governance data that this study needs, leaving a final sample of 362 firms and 1448 firm-year observations. Like the study of Core et al. (1999) , the variables proxying for the economic determinants of executive compensation were lagged one year to reduce potential endogeneity.
CEO compensation and firm performance
We focus on cash compensation because we are interested in the reward portion of total compensation. Hence, the cash compensation can be viewed as ex-post compensation depending on past and current performance (see, for example, Gaver
and Gaver, 1998; Comprix and Mueller, 2006) . Following Leone et al. (2006), we use the sum of bonus and salary, which is the total cash compensation, as the measurement of executive compensation. Moreover, we employ the nature log of cash compensation like most prior studies (see, e.g., Lambert and Larcker, 1987) . The nature log can mitigate the difference in executive compensation across firms and hence reduce heteroskedasticity. Among the alternative measures of executive compensation provided in the SinoFin database, average pay of top three highest-paid executives, which composes of the salary and bonus, resembles most prior studies on executive compensation and thus will be the focus of our study. In Table 2 , 111,322 Yuan, 141,984 Yuan, 178,158 Yuan, 207,196 Yuan, 242,590 Yuan, and 313,164 Yuan in 2001 , 2002 , 2003 , 2004 , 2005 , 2006 , and 2007 respectively. That is, the average CEO compensation almost increased by 400% in 7 years.
In panel B the firms with compensation committee tend to pay their executives more than We use return on assets (ROA) as our accounting performance measure, while we also use industry-adjusted stock returns as our financial performance measure to verify the robustness of our results 6 . We define ROA as the ratio of net income to the book value of assets 7 . Our measure of industry-adjusted stock return is measured as annual stock returns minus industry mean stock returns. In our regressions, total cash compensation of CEO is used, contemporaneous and lagged performance measures can both impact the executive cash compensation and hence we use lagged performance in our study. As a sensitivity test, we rerun our analyses with contemporaneous performance measurements and receive similar results. Panel B of Most empirical studies on CEO compensation use data for individual executives from U.S. firms while the closest studies to ours are Kaplan (1994) and Kato et al. (2007) that used similar executive compensation data for Japanese and Korean firms.
We begin with estimating the pay-performance semi-elasticity equations, like Kaplan (1994). That is,
ROA and stock returns provide different indicators of a firm's performance and thus they are associated with different pay-performance sensitivities for executive pay.
We use ln(CEOCOM) because ln(CEOCOM) is more likely than CEOCOM to be normally distributed.
Board characteristics
To examine our first hypotheses we collect data on the board characteristics. In particular, we determine the proportion of independent directors, board size and the number of board meetings. Large boards are likely to be less effective than small boards because large boards may have free-riding problems in decision making (Jensen, 1993) and hence tend to compromise and make decisions in favour of managers' rather than shareholders' interests (Yermack, 1996) . As shown in Panel B Table 2 , the proportion of independent directors on board is about 24% in full sample when the firms with CC have a much higher percentage of independent directors on board than firms without CC (31% vs. 20%). The mean board size is 9.75, comparable to the average board size 13 for U.S. firms (Core et al., 1999) . In terms of board diligence, the average annual board meetings were 7.14 over the sample period and the frequency is higher for firms with CC than for firms without CC (7.6 vs. 7).
Following our baseline model, we investigate the impact of board independence on the pay-performance semi-elasticity equations, an adaption of the model in Kaplan
Where ln(CEOCOM) is CEO compensation, calculated as the sum of top three highest executive compensation divided by three; Performance is return on assets (ROA); Boardind is the proportion of independent directors on board. The value of 3 β indicates the impact of board independence on CEO pay-performance relation and is our interest of variable.
Compensation committee
Following our baseline model again, this time we test the impact of compensation committee independence on the pay-performance semi-elasticity equations, an adaption of the model in Kaplan (1994) . That is, In other variables, we define an indicator variable "paiddirector" to be equal to one if at least one member on the compensation committee gets paid from the firm they serve and zero otherwise. In addition, smaller compensation committees may have a shortage of monitor on management (Bushman et al., 2004) while larger compensation committees may be less easily influenced by CEOs. On the other hand, Jensen (1993) argues that lower cooperation costs and less free-riding may make small boards more effective. Thus, it is possible that small compensation committees can be more effective. We use the nature log of the number of directors on the compensation committees as one characteristic of compensation committee. 
Other variables
We include several control variables in the regression analysis to account for firm-specific characteristics that influence executive compensation. First, firm size is measured by ln(sales). We also collect data on ownership structure, including the concentration of ownership of the second to fifth largest stockholders. If the State is the major shareholder in a firm then the variable state is coded one and zero otherwise.
The state is the largest shareholder in about 78% of the observations. Firm risk is a measure of the firm's information environment and the risk of its operating environment (Core et al., 1999) and thus is a potential determinant of the level of executive compensation. In our study, firm risk is defined as the standard deviation of the monthly stock returns over the previous 12 months. Leverage is also expected to play an important role in executive pay-performance relation in terms of the potential agency costs of debt (Iyengar et al. 2005) . We therefore include leverage rate as control variable, which is measured as the book value of debt to the book value of shareholders' equity.
In order to include the impact of growth opportunity in executive compensation research (Sun and Cahan 2009; Firth et al., 2007) , we also use lagged market value to book value of assets as a proxy for growth opportunities. Moreover, a dummy variable is defined to indicate if the firm made a loss in the previous year. Other factors are included in our study to account for industry and year effects (see Table 1 for the definitions). Industry is defined in terms of the securities exchange classifications and year is measured by three indicator variables.
Our results indicate that the mean leverage rate was 1.17 over the sample period and it was higher for firms with CC than for firms without CC (1.33 vs. 1.08). The data in Panel B of Table 2 Moreover, State-owned firms are more likely to form a compensation committee (82% State-owned firms in firms with CC and 79% State-owned firms in firms without CC). With regard to stock return variance, firms with CC experienced the same firm risk as firms without CC while they experienced a lower growth opportunity than their counterparts (3.76 vs. 4.44). Finally, the average likelihood of making a negative pre-tax profit was about 7% for all firms. firms with CC are much more likely to make a negative pre-tax profit than firms without CC (8% vs. 6%).
Results
The pay-performance relation
In this section, we use multivariate analysis to test our five hypotheses. We examine how board structure and CC structure affect levels of executive compensation and executive pay-performance relation and whether the presence of CC is associated with more effective board as well as more sensitive executive pay-performance relation.
Board results
The cross-sectional multiple regression results are shown in Table 3 The regression model 3 also contains three indicator variables that control for the year in which executive compensation was paid and eight indicator variables that control for sub-industry membership.
The signs of the estimated coefficients on the accounting performance measure (ROA) and on the financial performance measure (RET) are expected to be positive; that is, the better the firm performance, the higher the executive compensation.
Additionally, the sign of the estimated coefficient on the proportion of directors on board is expected to be negative, which is our first hypothesis. According to our hypothesis, the expected sign on the coefficient of the interaction term ROA*boardind (or RET*boardind) is positive; that is, the executive pay-performance relation is stronger in firms with more independent directors on board than in firms with less independent directors on board. In accordance with most of the published literature, the signs on ln(boardsize), sales, stdret and opportunityg are expected to be positive while the signs on state and lagnegprofit are expected to be negative. We do not make priori predictions regarding the signs of the estimated coeffients on boardmeeting, h5
and LEV because prior evidence is either not compelling or is mixed. We then compute variance inflation factors (VIF) for main variables and they are all below 8.2.
These diagnostic statistics suggest that multicollinearity is not a major problem in our models.
compensation and pay-performance relation. The proportion of directors on board has significant effects on executive pay-performance relation statistically and economically as we expected. However, the sign on coefficient of board independence is opposite to our expectation and significant when the estimates on other coefficients are not significant. That is, firms with larger proportion of independent directors on board will not change the level of executive compensation but will strengthen the relation between executive pay and firm performance and thus enhance internal corporate governance. Therefore, Hypothesis 1a is not supported whilst Hypothesis 1b is strongly supported.
To examine the effect of board independence further, we divide the sample according to whether the board is bigger, whether the accounting performance is higher, and whether the proportion of independent directors on board is greater than one-third. The results are presented in Table 4 . All regression analyses focus on our main firm performance ROA. First, independent directors are likely to exert different influence on corporate governance structure when the level of accounting performance is different. Therefore, we use one indicator variable to indicate whether the ROA is the highest (in the highest quartile of ROA) or lowest (in the lowest quartile of ROA), resulting in two sub-samples. The results in Table 4 show a significantly positive relation between board independence and executive pay-performance relation in well performing firms while their counterparts do not.
Moreover, it suggests that the impact of board independence on executive pay-performance relation in full sample is basically driven by those well performing firms. "Guidelines for establishing an independent directors system for listed companies" in which one third independent directors are required for listed firms by June, 2003. difference in their effectiveness. The results are also presented in Table 4 . They show a significant positive effect of board independence on executive pay-performance and a marginal significant negative effect of board independence on executive compensation (p=0.09) in firms with less than 30% independent directors as our Hypotheses 1a and 1b expected. However, no such significant effects are found in firms with more than 30% independent directors on board, suggesting a more cosmetic board in Chinese listed firms as long as they already have required percentage of independent directors on board.
Secondly
Compensation committee results
The questions, to which we now turn, are whether the relationship between executive compensation and firm performance is stronger for those firms with more independent directors on the compensation committee than the firms with less independent directors on the compensation committee.
We investigate the regressions by creating sub-sample. To be included in the sub-sample, these firms are required to (1) independence are tested on executive pay-performance relation. The estimates on coefficients of control variables are not reported here because they are not of direct interests for our study. In the second column of Table 5 , we investigate the impact of the presence of CC on the level of executive compensation as well as on executive pay-performance relation. The coefficient of the interaction term of CC presence and firm performance is not significant for both performance measurements. Moreover, the estimates of coefficient on CC are both significantly positive, which is to the contrast of our Hypothesis 2a and 2b, suggesting an unimportant role played by CC in Chinese listed firms. In the second column, we investigate the impact of CC independence on executive compensation as well as pay-performance relation and find no significant estimates for our interests of variables. That is, neither the presence of CC nor the independence of CC is shown as having any effect on executive compensation. On the other hand, as we expected, as long as at least one member on CC gets paid by the firm the level of executive compensation is higher.
To further examine the effect of CC, we divide the CC firm sub-sample again according to whether the proportion of independent directors on CC is greater than 60% 11 . That is, the CC firm sub-sample was further divided to two sub-samples with regard to different CC independence. The ROA in firms with more than 60% independent directors on CC positively associates with executive compensation.
Moreover, the coefficient of ROA is statistically and economically significant.
Therefore, even the estimate on the coefficient of the interaction of CC independence and ROA is significantly (but is not significant economically) negative, the partial effect of ROA on executive pay is still positive. On the other hand, those firms with less than 60% independent directors on CC show a positively significant effect of CC independence on executive pay-performance relation although the beta is not large ( β =0.08). Thus, not like their counterparts, firms with less than 60% CC independence partially strengthen their executive pay-performance link when they increase their CC independence. In addition, the presence of paid director on CC shows significantly positive effect on executive pay for both sub-samples. We also get similar results when we change the performance measurement to stock returns (RET) which presented in Panel B. Consequently, neither the presence of CC nor the CC independence show any important effect on the level of executive pay or pay-performance relation, but firms with high CC independence do present some positive impact of CC independence to enhance the relation of executive pay and firm 11 The proportion of independent directors on CC mostly concentrates on the range of 40%-70% in
Chinese listed firms; therefore we select the cut-off point as 60% to keep sufficient variability in our sample.
performance, providing no support for Hypothesis 2a while providing partial support for Hypothesis 2b.
Board independence and the presence of compensation committee
Next, to test our hypothesis developed in previous section that the pay-performance relations are stronger for firms with larger proportion of independent directors on board when the compensation committee presents, we classify all firms into firms with CC and firms without CC and estimate the impact of board independence on executive pay-performance separately.
The results of our regressions using Eq. (2) Table 7 shows the regression results of Eq. (4) for our sample. When we take the interactive effect of board independence and compensation committee into account, the estimate of coefficient on the interaction term is significant both statistically and economically ( 6 β =5.88, p=0.05). That is, consistent with our expectation, the presence of compensation committee assists the independent board and hence enhances the CEO pay-performance relation. Therefore, both independent board and compensation committee are required to maximize the CEO pay-performance relation.
In terms of the results from prior section, the hypothesis was supported that when compensation committee presents a larger portion of independent directors on board enhances the link between executive compensation and performance. To further test the effects of compensation committee, following Wild (1994), we examine the effect of board independence on executive pay-performance relation before and after the formation of compensation committee.
The primary tests of the hypotheses of our study focus on the magnitude of the slope parameter from the regression of executive compensation on firm performance and board independence. Specifically, the following regression is executed:
Where ln(CEOCOM) and Boardind are as defined in Table 1, 1 β is the pay-performance relation and 3 β is the variable of interest in our study, indicating the impact of board independence on executive pay-performance relation. In order to eliminate the tax impact, we use pre-tax profit to calculate ROA -1 (return on assets, lagged one year) instead of net income in the regressions.
The regression results for Eq. (4a) are reported in Panel A of Table 8 . As expected, the parameter 3 β on ROA -1 *Boardind, when using all periods' data, is positive (5.16) and significantly greater than zero at the 0.001 level. The central hypothesis to be examined is whether or not the effect of board independence on executive pay-performance is greater after committee formation than before. The second and third rows in Panel A of Table 8 present regression results for the periods before and the periods after formation. Consistent with increased board effectiveness, a larger proportion of independent directors on board is positively associated with stronger executive pay-performance relation (p=0.002) for the periods after committee formation while no significant relation between board independence and executive pay-performance is found for the periods before committee formation.
As another test of the hypothesis, a second regression equation is formulated as follows: β , in a test for a change in the effect of board independence on executive pay-performance relation from the periods before to the periods after formation, is positive (6.49) and is marginal significant (p=0.065). The evidence indicates that the effect of board independence on executive pay-performance is significantly greater after formation than before. That is, the hypothesis that greater board independence can strengthen the relation between executive compensation and firm performance when the compensation committee presents is supported again by testing time periods before and after the committee formation.
In order to investigate the effect of board and compensation committees in more details, we also run regressions for firms with CC and without CC over 2005-2007, during which the non-tradable shares reform was introduced and progressed in China.
It can be seen from Table 9 that board independence shows a significant negative effect on CEO pay-performance relation for those firms without CC (β=-6.35) while board independence affects firms with CC in an insignificant way, supporting our previous evidence that independent directors work more effectively in firms with CC than in firms without CC. Moreover, in Table 10 , we use one indicator variable to indicate whether the ROA is the highest (in the top quartile of ROA) or lowest (in the bottom quartile of ROA), resulting in two sub-samples. Interestingly, even though the interaction term ROA*COMCIND in best-performing firms shows a marginal significant negative association, it is not economically significant, and if combined with the effect of ROA (β=8.86, p=0.03), CEO pay-performance relation would be significantly positive, compared with poorly-performing firms. Consequently, best-performing firms link their CEO compensation with firm performance much closer than those poorly-performing firms after the non-tradable shares reform started, suggesting better corporate governance in best-performing firms.
With respect to the interaction effect of independent board and compensation committee, we also test the model in Eq. (4) 
Summary and conclusions
As Finkelstein and Hambrick remarked, "Boards have long been considered to play an important role in the establishment of executive pay" (1996) . However, as noted earlier, those studies on board structure and pay-performance relation provide mixed evidence in both Western countries and transitional economies such as China. This paper has provided the first rigorous estimates on the effect of board independence on executive pay-performance for Chinese listed firms with and without a compensation committee. To do so, we have assembled the panel data (that provide information not only on executive compensation and firm performance but also on compensation committee composition) for 362 manufacturing listed firms on Contrary to a popular belief that Chinese corporate governance, specifically the executive compensation scheme, does not work effectively, we provide new empirical evidence. Moreover, the function of Chinese boards and their sub-committees is believed to be more cosmetic than effective. However, we have found that executive cash compensation is more related to accounting and stock market performance when the proportion of independent directors on board is larger. And our results show that the independent directors on board work more effectively on setting executive compensation to the maximum of shareholder wealth if they have a compensation committee to offer them help and provide information. Perhaps even more importantly, our analysis has further revealed for the first time that such overall significant effect of board independence on executive pay-performance link is driven by firms with a compensation committee and that no such relation exists for firms without a compensation committee. As such, our study complements earlier works which tend to point to significant impact of board independence on executive pay-performance relation in general.
Our results also suggest that independent directors on board are more likely to be a good governance mechanism in setting optimal executive compensation when they formed their compensation committee. As such, our findings may partially explain the reason why prior literature provides mixed evidence on board effectiveness in terms of setting appropriate executive pay.
Further investigation also shows that the positive effect of board independence on executive pay-performance link is more evident in well performing firms and in firms with very large or very small board. That is, firm performance and the size of board may affect the effectiveness of independent directors on setting optimal executive compensation. Finally, extended findings clarify that board independent is positively significantly associated with stronger executive pay-performance relation in time periods after than before the formation of compensation committee, supporting the important role played by a compensation committee.
However, no significant relation was found in our study about the impact of compensation committee independence on executive pay-performance relation.
Consequently, the independent directors on compensation committee alone are not found to have significant effect on setting optimal executive compensation, while our results suggest that the existence of compensation committee can assist independent directors on board to design appropriate executive compensation.
Our results from the regressions for firms with a CC and without a CC over [2005] [2006] [2007] indicate that during the non-tradable shares reform, board independence shows a significant negative effect on CEO pay-performance relation for those firms without a CC (β=-6.35) while board independence affects firms with a CC in an insignificant way, supporting our previous evidence that independent directors work more effectively in firms with a CC than in firms without a CC. In addition, best-performing firms are more likely to link their CEO compensation with firm performance than those poorly-performing firms since the non-tradable shares reform, suggesting better corporate governance in best-performing firms.
Based on our knowledge, there is no prior research on the link of executive pay-performance relation and the change of ownership structure focusing on the time periods after the non-tradable shares reform. In our future work, we will investigate the impact of the change of ownership structure on executive pay-performance link since the start of the reform. To do so, we will need to continue to collect the board, ownership movement and executive compensation data in the coming years as non-tradable shares reform progresses, in particular the adoption of a compensation committee and its composition are implemented. 
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